Difference between revisions of "Kernel Development"
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JamesMorris (Talk | contribs) (Added new syscall checking) |
JamesMorris (Talk | contribs) (added google containers) |
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== To Do List == | == To Do List == | ||
+ | * Investigate google containers. | ||
+ | |||
* Add hook for filesystems with binary mount data (per requests by fsdevel folk) | * Add hook for filesystems with binary mount data (per requests by fsdevel folk) | ||
Revision as of 13:47, 29 May 2007
To Do List
- Investigate google containers.
- Add hook for filesystems with binary mount data (per requests by fsdevel folk)
- Fix performance issue with ephemeral port binding & high connection rate.
- Compile out LSM hooks & allow SELinux to be linked directly.
- Automate checking for new syscalls in kernels (-mm, -rc etc).
- change Kconfig to use select instead of depends (eparis RH BZ# 228899)
- remove secondary module stacking code (eparis RH BZ#231890)
- security_port_sid needs optimization (eparis RH BZ#234531)
- explicitly set i_ino on all creations in selinuxfs (eparis RH BZ#235248)
- allow undefined classes and permissions in kernel (eparis RH BZ#235280)
- Reduce memory usage of selinux structs (eparis RH BZ#235284)
- fine grained enforcement of sysfs objects (RH BZ#228902)
- labeled net needs better passing of labels over loopback
- additional support of a security netfilter table for secmark/net forwarding
- Normalize the SELinux in-kernel API.
- Namespacing of SELinux global functions and variables.
- NFSv4 support
- KVM controls
- Finer-grained proc checking (so that we don't require full ptrace permission just to read process state),
- Improve/fix ioctl checking (see prior discussions on selinux and linux-security-module list),
- Revoke memory-mapped file access upon policy change or setxattr.
- Real device labeling and access control (i.e. bind a label to a device in the kernel irrespective of what device node is used to access it so that a process that can create any device nodes at all can't effectively bypass all device access controls just by creating an arbitrary node to any device in a type accessible to it),
- Full APIs for getting and setting security contexts of sockets and IPC objects.
- Polyinstantiated ports
- Increased granularity for Generic Netlink
- Better support for sys_splice and related syscalls
- Review sys_fallocate if/when it is merged
- CIFS support for single-context clients
- lhype controls (investigate & compare with KVM controls)
- Investigate integration with integrity & measurement
- Crypto policy for domains & object handling
- Expand LTP as a full regression testuite for every permission & class
- Convert sk_callback_lock to RCU
- Redo performance testing & profiling
- Support for kernel namespaces
- Better controls for posix message queues (?)
Known Bugs
- exporting nfs with the nohide options causes problems on ia64 clients (struct nfs_mount_data corruption)
IRC Channel
- irc.oftc.net #selinux-kernel